Germany – Liability of members of German Vorstand (executive board) by Wooldridge, Frank
Germany
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by Frank Wooldridge
E xecutive board members of a German public company ('directors') 
must exercise the care of a sound 
and conscientious business 
manager (Aktiengesetz (AktG) 
para. 93(1) No. 1). This general 
clause is thought to be applicable 
to all the duties of directors, for 
example in relation to their 
managerial responsibilities, their 
fiduciary duties and duties arising 
out of specific provisions of the
AktG, see para. 80, 81, 83, 88, 91(2) and 92 thereof. The 
standard is not that of an ordinary businessman, but that of a 
man in a leading and responsible position as the manager of 
other people's property in a specific enterprise. The test is an 
objective one, and individual abilities are not taken into account. 
Furthermore, inability or inexperience is not an excuse. When 
an action is brought against them, it appears that directors have 
to show compliance with this strict rule (AktG, para. 93(2), 
No. 2). The general view is that the due care requirement is an 
absolute one, irrespective of subjective fault involving some 
degree of blameworthiness (Vorwerjbarkeit) and any failure, 
however slight, may result in a requirement to pay damages. 
However, the German courts and academic commentators do 
not always seem to have adopted this view.
DIRECTOR'S, SPECIFIC LIABILITIES
Directors are required to have a general insight into 
management and business conditions, and to have some 
understanding of the connections between law and society. They 
should understand the fundamental structure of their own 
company and have an elementary knowledge of the framework 
and organisation of companies in general. They should also have 
some idea of fundamental legal concepts such as directors' 
fiduciary and other duties. Such fiduciary duties have become 
recognised through the medium of decisions of the courts 
rather than that of the Aktiengesetz, but breaches of such duties 
will usually come within para. 93. When new laws affecting 
business enterprises are enacted, it may be advisable for 
directors to take legal advice on such laws: ignorance of them 
could possibly result in liability. Directors should also be aware 
of matters relating to the product which the company makes 
and should certainly be able to comprehend the annual balance 
sheet. A higher degree of care may be required from 
professionally qualified directors, such as lawyers, certified 
accountants, or bankers. This was made apparent in a case heard 
by the Landgericht of Diisseldorf in 1994 (Die Aktiengesellschqft 
1994, at p. 330) in which the court held that the manager of a 
private company who was an experienced lawyer and who had 
also served on the board of a large public company, could not 
escape liability in respect of the private company by pleading 
that he had relied on an expert opinion which he had requested.
A director is also liable for failure to control his colleagues. If 
each director has particular functions allocated to him by the 
statutes of the company, the contract of employment or the 
company rules (Geschaftsordnung: see AktG, para. 77), then such 
a director is, in principle, liable in respect of his own sphere of 
activity. However he may become liable for the activities of 
fellow directors if he has exercised inadequate supervision over 
them, or has failed to intervene where the wrongful conduct of 
a director has become known throughout the business, or where 
such conduct has failed to become public knowledge through 
his own lack of care. The division of functions between different 
directors in one of the ways described in this paragraph does not 
release any of them from their duty of supervision 
(Uberwachungsrjflicht), which may be exercised with the help ot 
agents, where necessary. Many of the decisions of the courts 
concerning the duties of directors involve this duty of 
supervision.
Directors must not disclose confidential information and 
secrets of the company, in particular trade and business secrets, 
which have become known to them as a result of their service 
on the management board (AktG, para. 93(1), No. 2). This 
provision encompasses all the business projects and policies 
aimed at by the enterprise and applies in relation to the 
objectives, course, and results of discussions of board meetings. 
Unfortunately 'labour directors' (Arbeitsdirektor) who must be 
appointed in certain large companies, have sometimes been said 
to have acted in breach of this requirement, as have employees' 
representatives and representatives of banks on the supervisory 
board, who are bound by a corresponding obligation of secrecy.
BURDEN OF PROOF
In an action under AktG, para. 93, the company is required 
to produce evidence of acts of the directors which have caused 
damage. As far as the proof of causation is concerned, inference 
from the surrounding circumstances or the rules of prima facie 
evidence will support the company's action. Furthermore the 
question of causation is left to the discretion of the judge in 
accordance with the provisions of para. 287 of the Civil Procedure 
Code. Damage is presumed in the special cases mentioned in 
AktG, para. 93(3), a detailed account of which is beyond the 
scope of this short article. The general view is that the burden 
of proof is placed upon the director to show that he exercised 
the care of a diligent and conscientious manager. However it has 
been argued by some writers that this reversal of the normal civil 
burden of proof (which has also been held to apply to private 
companies and co-operative societies), only applies to the 
extent that a director has to show that he has not been guilty of 
subjective fault. According to Goette, who takes an intermediate 
view, in an influential article in the Zeitschrift jur Gesellschaftrecht 
for 1995 (at p. 648) the plaintiff has to demonstrate that the 
damage has been suffered by reason of an act or omission of the 
director, which may possibly constitute a breach of duty, whilst 
the director has to show that he has fulfilled his duties, or has 
not been guilty of subjective fault (conduct which is morally 27
blameworthy), or that the damage would still have ensued if he 
had complied with his duties.
The Supreme Court may have alleviated somewhat the burden 
of proof placed on the officer of a co-operative society who had 
delegated duties to a possibly dishonest or incompetent 
consultant in a recent case: see NJW 1997, 1905. It required the 
co-operative society to prove that the officer had allowed the 
consultant to receive payment for advisory services which were 
not included in the settlement agreed upon, whilst the officer 
was required to prove that she had made payments to a 
competent consultant, who had rendered the appropriate 
services for such payment, which led to concrete results which 
were beneficial to the co-operative society'. Thus, in this case, 
the burden of proving that no breach of duty had occurred in 
relation to particular matters was laid on each party. Such an 
approach is perhaps justified in particular cases, especially 
perhaps where certain duties are delegated. The application of 
the relevant German rules governing the burden of proof, 
whatever their precise nature, may well depend upon the facts 
and circumstances of the particular case and in many cases it 
may be hard to predict the outcome. Although the German 
rules would generally seem to impose a greater burden on 
directors than do those that are applicable in the UK, they 
appear workable, although the operation of para. 93(2), No. 2 
is open to some dispute. In some situations   in which the 
burden placed on that company is lessened   its effect is easy to 
understand. Thus, for example, a company might assert that its 
actual assets and resources were less than those shown in the 
books. The directors would then be called on to explain this 
deficiency, the reason for which should be within their 
knowledge. They might well hope to convince the court that this 
depletion did not take place through any fault of their own, but 
resulted from inaccurate bookkeeping, for which they could not 
be held responsible, the assets having been disposed of in 
specified ways (see BGH BB95, 1754, a case which concerned a 
private company).
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It would seem that the adoption of a standard of care for 
directors similar to that which prevails in Germany might be 
opposed in the UK, especially by directors of small companies 
and part-time directors. The reversal of the burden of proof, 
whatever it might entail, would probably also be unpopular in 
business circles. However there seems nothing objectionable in 
asking directors to explain matters within their knowledge.
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY
The statutes or company rules (Geschqftsordnung) of an AG 
(Aktiengesellschaft, public stock corporation) often provide that 
directors shall act by majority resolution. If the resolution is in 
breach of the company's statutes or the law, the directors who 
vote for it may incur joint and several liability for damage 
resulting from it, as may directors who did not vote for the 
resolution, but who subsequently help to carry it out. Persons
who wish to avoid such liability may help themselves to do so by 
refusing to put their signature to particular transactions and 
expressing their opposition to them. Furthermore it may 
sometimes be necessary for them to report such transactions to 
the supervisory board, which may take various courses of action, 
including the dismissal of directors, the calling of a general 
meeting, or ordering that certain transactions may only be 
carried out with the consent of the supervisory board.
CLARIFICATION NEEDED?
The general view is that the due care requirement is an absolute one, 
irrespective of subjective fault involving some degree of 
blameworthiness (Vorwerfbarkeit) and any failure, however slight, may 
result in a requirement to pay damages. However, the German courts 
and academic commentators do not always seem to have adopted this 
view.
Each director who participates in a wrongful act is responsible 
to the company for the entire resultant damage. However the 
director will be entitled to a contribution from the other 
directors who participate in the wrongdoing, the amount of 
which will vary according to the degree to which they 
participated in the wrongful act and the nature of the 
WTongdoing (see art. 426 and 254 of the Civil Code).
RELEASE FROM LIABILITY
Directors will not be liable to the company m damages if their 
action depends on a.lawful resolution of the general meeting 
(AktG, para. 93(4), No. 1). Such a resolution may be passed 
because the directors have referred a question of the 
management of the company to the general meeting (AktG, 
para. 119(2)), or because a matter is otherwise within the 
competence of the general meeting. However the general view 
is that subsequent ratification of a breach of duty does not 
relieve the directors from liability. Such liability is also not 
precluded because the supervisory board has approved the 
transaction (AktG, para. 93(4), No. 2). The company may, as a 
general rule, only waive the damage claim or enter into ao ' J o
settlement after three years, and if a minority representing at 
least 10% of the stated capital does not object (AktG, para. 
93(4), No. 3). Thus the discharge or Entlastung of the directors 
by the general meeting only expresses a general approval of the 
management's performance: it does not effect a waiver of claims 
for damages (AktG, para. 120(2)). A controversial exception to 
this rule is available by a unanimous vote in favour of the 
discharge (BGHZ 29.385). It should be emphasised that no one 
may exercise voting rights, whether by voting in respect of their 
own shares or acting as a proxy, or a resolution whereby they 
become discharged or released from an obligation, or on a 
determination of whether the company shall assent to a claim 
against them (AktG, para. 136(1)).
BRINGING ACTIONS AGAINST DIRECTORS
Although the standard of care imposed is rather higher than 
is the case in the UK, actions by the company, acting either 
through the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) or the general 
meeting, against directors who fail to comply with the standard 
(AktG, para. 112 and 147) are comparatively rare in Germany.
Two interesting decisions of the Landgericht of Diisseldorf 
concerning, inter alia, actions against directors, are reported in 
the leading German company law journal Die Aktiengesellschaft of 
1994, at p. 328 and 330. The first of these cases concerned the
duty of a company to pursue claims against members of the 
executive board of an insurance company, where breaches of 
AktG, para. 93 and 116, as well as of an insurance statute, were 
alleged to have occurred by the plaintiff, a member of the 
supervisory board of the defendant company. The breaches in 
question appeared to be serious (certainly in their financial 
consequences) and deliberate, involving impermissible financial 
transactions through the medium of wholly-owned subsidiaries 
with a rather dubious company set up in London. The 
supervisory board resolved not to sue the finance directors and 
the chairman of the executive board of the insurance company 
in respect of the alleged breaches of their duties. The Landgericht 
held that the plaintiff could avoid the resolution of the 
supervisory board (which was a nullity) because this board had 
not given proper attention to the welfare of the insurance 
company when deciding not to bring proceedings. The relevant 
directors had been responsible for wrongful acts which had 
caused very considerable damage to their company; an action 
could therefore be brought on behalf of the company, against the 
delinquent directors. Rather surprisingly, the Oberlandesgericht 
(Regional Appeal Court) of Diisseldorf held, on appeal, that the 
resolution of the supervisory board was not a nullity, because its 
members had acted within the scope of their business judgment 
(Die Aktiengesellschaft 1995, at p. 416). The German Supreme 
Court adopted a stricter view than the Regional Appeal Court, 
holding that if the supervisory board came to the conclusion 
that directors were liable for damages, they should then consider 
whether action against them would be likely to have a positive 
result. If they so decided they must pursue the claim unless 
there were overriding or equally significant contra-indications 
based on the welfare of the company (Die Aktiengesellschaft 1997, 
at p. 377).
^DEGREE OF CARE
When new laws affecting business enterprises are enacted, it may be 
advisable for directory to take legal advice on such laws: ignorance of 
them could possibly result in liability. A higher degree of care may be 
required from professionally qualified directors, such as lawyers, 
certified accountants, or bankers.
As an alternative to the bringing of an action bv the
O O J
supervisory board on behalf of the company, AktG, para. 147 
provides for such an action to be brought by the general 
meeting. Furthermore it also provides for a statutory derivative 
action. However, the requirement that this should be supported 
by shareholders representing at least one-tenth of the 
company's stated capital, who are required to pay their own 
costs if they are unsuccessful (contingency fees are not 
recognised in Germany), makes this action of limited value. The 
position of minority shareholders, however, may be improved as 
a result of the provisions of the new art. 147(3), incorporated 
into the AktG by the Law of 30 April 1998 (BGB1 1.783). It is 
noteworthy that in the second of the two actions heard by the 
Landgericht of Diisseldorf in 1994, which was concerned with 
similar alleged breaches of duty to the first one, the court held 
that the dutv of good faith owed by the shareholders to their
J O J
company might sometimes require such shareholders to vote in 
favour of the company bringing an action against its directors 
under AktG, para. 93. The court held that the negative vote cast 
twice in the general meeting of the defendant holding company 
against supporting the lack of proceedings on behalf of its 
subsidiary   the insurance company   and wrhich resulted from
the negative vote of the defendant 50% shareholder in the 
holding company should be disallowed. The reason for this 
decision was that the latter vote was contrary to the 
shareholder's duty of good faith to the holding company (a 
Gesellschaft mit beschrankter Haftung (GmbH) which held 50% of 
the share capital of the insurance company)   and to his fellow 
50% shareholder in the holding company   the plaintiff. The 
court also held that the plaintiff shareholder could obtain 
damages on behalf of the holding company against the defendant 
shareholder (Die Aktiengesellschaft 1994, at p. 330).
However the Regional Appeal Court at Diisseldorf took a 
different view from the Landgericht concerning the effect of the 
two contested resolutions of 1992 and 1993 contending, 
somewhat surprisingly, that there had been no breach of the 
defendant shareholders duty- of good faith, and that shareholders 
have a wide discretion when casting their vote. It also held that
O
no claim for damages could be brought on behalf of the holding 
company (ZIP 1996, at p. 1083). A claim for damages by the 
insurance company based upon two resolutions of the general 
meeting of that company in 1994 and 1995 was upheld by the 
Regional Appeal Court of Diisseldorf (Die Aktiengesellschaft 1997, 
at p. 231). The judgment of the court deals with a number of 
issues. It held that a finance director of the AG was liable in 
damages to it by reason of his breach of this duty of care under 
AktG, para. 93(1). He was responsible for making very 
substantial payments to an investment company which had an 
accommodation address in London without taking security, and 
the AG suffered very considerable losses as a result of its failure. 
The court held that no person conducting the business of 
another in a responsible way would have acted in such a manner 
without taking security. As the court emphasised, there seemed 
to have been a considerable element of blameworthiness or 
subjective fault on the part of the director.
In addition to the possibility of an action against directors 
who breach their duties under AktG para. 93, or who commit 
other breaches of their duties, there are alternative methods of 
action against such directors. Thus it may be possible to dismiss 
them if there is just cause (wichtige Griinde), subject to the 
possibility of their reinstatement by a court. Such cause may be 
held to exist if a motion of no confidence is passed by the 
general meeting, or if there have been breaches of the director'sO O'
duty of care (which will be treated as including breaches of his 
fiduciary duties, for example of not anticipating corporate 
opportunities). However if such a director has a contract of 
employment, his dismissal may result in an action for damages 
(AktG, para. 84)
COMPROMISE OF CLAIM
Provided the requirements of AktG, para. 93(4) are complied 
with, a compromise of a claim for damages against a director 
under para. 93(2) may take place. The period of three years 
which is required before such a compromise can take place is 
intended to give sufficient time for the quantification of 
damages. However such a compromise will not extinguish 
director's liability for damages towards the creditors (AktG, 
para. 93(5). The requirement of the gross violation (grob 
Pjlichtverletzung) of the duty of care of a diligent and 
conscientious manager will obviously limit the frequency of such 
claims under para. 93(5), as will considerations of cost, and 
possible lack of knowledge on the part of creditors of a claim for 
damages by the company against the directors. 29
CONCLUSION
The detailed rules governing the standard of care of the 
directors of an AG results from the jurisprudence of the courts 
and the writings of jurists. The German approach appears to 
work in practice, although sometimes the precise result of 
litigation involving the application of para. 93(1), No. 1 and 
93(2), No. 2, is difficult to predict. This appears inevitable in 
the case of general clauses. It may be unfortunate that the exact 
scope of the rule governing the reversal of the burden of proof 
is not entirely clear. It may well be the case that different 
approaches are adopted by the courts, dependent on the facts of
the case, and that this situation may not merit undue concern. 
It appears that in the past the German courts have given 
insufficient attention to the need of directors faced with a 
difficult choice to exercise their business judgment, but their 
approach to this question now seems to be changing, as is 
apparent from the dicta in the decision of the High Court 
reported in Die Atkiengesellschaft 1997, at p. 377. ™
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Planned legal framework for the changeover to the Euro
by Daniel M Tomasevic
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O n 20 February 1998, the Belgian Government approved a bill on the Euro ('the bill'). The bill purports to provide a legal framework with respect to 
the changeover to the Euro in Belgium. Accordingly it enshrines 
some of the principles and ideas found in the National Changeover 
Plan, issued in August 1996, which provides a general framework 
for the preparation of the Belgian economy for the successful 
introduction of the single currency.
This review of the bill will touch on the following issues:
  continuity of contracts;
  dual pricing;
  fiscal, social security and labour implications of EMU;
  conversion and rounding issues;
  substitution of reference interest rates;
  increase and rounding of capital;
  redenomination of securities; and
  continuity of contracts.
The bill does not contain any general provision on continuity 
of contracts after 1 January 1999. Such continuity will be 
sufficiently ensured in Belgium by EC regulation (Regulation 
1103/97, OJ L162/1) - which has direct effect and primacy - in 
particular art. 3 thereof which reads as follows:
'The introduction of the Euro shall not have the effect of altering any 
term of a legal instrument or of discharging or excusing performance 
under any legal instrument, nor give a party the right unilaterally to 
alter or terminate such an instrument.'
However with respect to particular contracts, i.e. contracts 
governing relations between vendors and consumers   in as 
much as these agents have been defined in the Law of 14 July 
1991 on Business Practices and Consumer Information and Protection — 
the bill intends to prohibit clauses whereby the vendor has the 
unilateral right to terminate or to amend the contract because of
O
the introduction of the Euro (art. 57). These clauses will 
generally be regarded as abusive. They will only be regarded as 
licit if the vendor is able to show that the clause has really been 
negotiated between the parties and has not been imposed upon 
the consumer as is often the case in that kind of relationship.
This will somehow restrict the freedom given to the parties by 
art. 3 of Regulation 1103/97 which ends as follows: 'This
provision is subject to anything which parties may have agreed.' 
This concern has been underlined by the Council of State, an 
advisory body to the government, in its opinion issued in April 
1998, where it said that the bill goes beyond what is provided by 
Regulation 11032/97. Accordingly, if passed by Parliament, this 
provision of the bill could well be challenged before the Belgian 
courts, and ultimately before the Court of Justice of the EC by 
way of preliminary reference under art. 177 of the EC Treaty.
DUAL PRICING
Pursuant to the Law of 14 July 1991 on Business Practices and 
Consumer Information and Protection, prices and rates in Belgium 
have to be indicated in BEE (Belgian francs). Compulsory 
pricing in BEE will remain for the period between 1 January 
1999 and 31 December 2001.
IMPACT OF THE EURO
The introduction of the Euro will have an important impact on 
financial markets, especially in a country such as Belgium, where 
public debt and private savings are amongst the highest in the 
world.
The bill does not provide for compulsory double-pricing. 
However the government is granted the power to impose such 
compulsory double-pricing (art. 54). Accordingly the 
government, if necessary, will impose dual pricing either as a 
general measure or, with respect to trade, of specific services or 
goods for which such double pricing is particularly needed.
Furthermore the bill provides that for specific contracts, i.e. 
consumer credit contracts (governed by the Law of 12 June 1991 
on Consumer Credit) and mortgage contracts (governed by the Law 
of 4 August 1992 on Mortgages) issued in Euros, the counter-value 
of the contract must also be shown to the borrower in BEF.
FISCAL, SOCIAL SECURITY AND LABOUR 
IMPLICATIONS
The bill (art. 9ff.) provides that, as from 1 January 1999, 
individuals and companies will be entitled to fill in their tax 
return (VAT, income tax, etc.) in Euros. Equally they will be able 
to submit documents in Euros to social security institutions (art. 
58).
